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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-1668 
___________ 
 
MICHAEL DUFFY, 
 
                                     Appellant 
 
v. 
 
KENT COUNTY LEVY COURT; P. BROOKS BANTA 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. Civil No. 09-cv-00198) 
District Judge:  Honorable Sue L. Robinson 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
October 23, 2014 
___________ 
 
No. 14-1669 
___________ 
 
MICHAEL DUFFY, 
 
                Appellant 
 
v. 
 
M. MANGE, CEO; KENT COUNTY DELAWARE;  
P. BROOKS BANTA, also known as Brooke; KENT LEVY COURT Inc. 
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____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. Civil No. 11-cv-00013) 
District Judge:  Honorable Sue L. Robinson 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
October 23, 2014 
 
 
Before:  RENDELL, CHAGARES and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: November 14, 2014) 
 
_________ 
 
O P I N I O N1 
   
 
PER CURIAM 
 Michael Duffy appeals pro se from District Court orders entering judgment in 
favor of the defendants.  For the following reasons, we will grant the Appellees’ motions 
to summarily affirm.   
 In May 2008, a storm damaged structures on a property in Kent County, Delaware, 
that is owned by Duffy.  The Division of Inspections and Enforcement of the Kent 
County Department of Planning Services deemed several of those structures unsafe and 
ordered their demolition if the unsafe conditions were not corrected.  After negotiating 
                                              
1 This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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for several months with Kent County authorities regarding the rehabilitation or 
demolition of the structures, Duffy filed a civil action in the Court of Chancery.  While 
that lawsuit was ongoing, Duffy was granted a demolition permit but failed to fully raze 
the structures.  Consequently, after proving Duffy with notice that it intended to proceed 
with demolition, Kent County caused the structures to be demolished.  Kent County 
placed a lien on the property in the amount of $1400, the cost of the demolition.  
Thereafter, Duffy initiated several lawsuits, including the two District of Delaware cases 
relevant to his present appeals.   
 In the first case, Duffy, who claims that he is disabled because of Parkinson’s 
Disease, alleged that the Kent County Levy Court (Kent County) and one of its 
commissioners, P. Brooks Banta, violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).  
By order entered September 27, 2010, the District Court granted the defendants’ motions 
to dismiss Commissioner Banta because the ADA provides for recovery against only a 
public entity.  Several years later, a Magistrate Judge recommended granting Kent 
County’s motion for summary judgment because Duffy failed to “produce sufficient 
evidence to create a material issue of fact as to whether he suffers from a disability within 
the meaning of the ADA.”  The Magistrate Judge also concluded that even if Duffy were 
disabled, his ADA claim would fail because he did not demonstrate that he was excluded 
from participation in, or denied the benefits of, a public entity’s services, programs, or 
activities.  By order entered March 10, 2014, the District Court adopted the Magistrate 
Judge’s recommendation, granted the motion for summary judgment, and entered 
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judgment in favor of Kent County.  Duffy appealed, and the matter was docketed here at 
C.A. No. 14-1668. 
 In the second case, Duffy alleged that Kent County, Banta, and another 
commissioner, Michael J. Petit de Mange, caused a taking of his property without 
compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment, and that the demolition of the 
structures resulted in an unlawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment.2  The defendants 
filed a motion for summary judgment.  The Magistrate Judge recommended granting that 
motion because condemnation of the structures was necessary to protect public safety and 
because Duffy was given proper notice and adequate recourse to challenge the 
demolition.  The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s report and 
recommendation.  Duffy appealed.  The matter was docketed here at C.A. No. 14-1669. 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  “We review district court decisions 
regarding both summary judgment and dismissal for failure to state a claim under the 
same de novo standard of review.”  Barefoot Architect, Inc. v. Bunge, 632 F.3d 822, 826 
(3d Cir. 2011).  “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient 
                                              
2 Duffy also alleged violations of the False Claims Act, federal statutes pertaining to 
eminent domain (16 U.S.C. § 814 and 49 U.S.C. § 24311), and Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 71.1, which governs condemnation proceedings.  By order entered May 3, 
2011, the District Court dismissed those claims as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1915(e)(2)(B) because they “have either been raised in various other complaints here 
and in the State Court, or they are related to the other cases [Duffy] has filed.”  Duffy 
does not designate that judgment as one which he seeks to appeal.  See Fed. R. App. P. 
3(c)(1).  Even if he had, however, we would affirm, for the reasons provided by the 
District Court. 
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factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotations omitted).  Summary 
judgment is proper where, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party and drawing all inferences in favor of that party, there is no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Kaucher v. Cnty. of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 422-23 (3d Cir. 
2006).  We may affirm on any basis supported by the record.  See Fairview Twp. v. EPA, 
773 F.2d 517, 525 n.15 (3d Cir. 1985). 
 Duffy alleged that Kent County and Commissioner Banta violated Title II of the 
ADA, which provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of 
such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, 
programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such 
entity.”  42 U.S.C. § 12132.  To establish a prima facie case under the ADA, Duffy “must 
demonstrate (1) that []he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) that the defendants 
are subject to [the ADA]; and (3) that []he was denied the opportunity to participate in or 
benefit from defendants’ services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminated 
against by defendants, by reason of [his] disability.”  Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 73-74 
(2d Cir. 2009).  In support of his claim, Duffy asserted that Kent County and 
Commissioner Banta failed to assist him in correcting the violations on his property and 
denied his request for a trash dumpster.  The undisputed facts, however, establish that 
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Duffy was neither “excluded from participation” nor “denied . . . benefits” because of his 
disability.3   
 After receiving notification that structures on his property had been deemed 
unsafe, Duffy contacted Kent County, identifying himself as disabled and requesting 
assistance in complying with the condemnation order.  In response, Kent County met 
with Duffy and explained the demolition and rehabilitation process, discussed the 
requirements for permits and deadline extensions, and offered to assign a staff member to 
assist Duffy.  Kent County also provided Duffy several extensions of time in which to 
correct the unsafe conditions on his property and granted his request for a demolition 
permit.  The only adverse action occurred when Kent County rejected Duffy’s request for 
a trash dumpster.  The Director of the Department of Planning Services for Kent County 
explained in an affidavit that, although the County had provided two dumpsters for a 
community-organized storm debris clean-up event, it “never provides trash dumpsters at 
its expense to private land owners for activities that benefit only one person or parcel of 
land.”  By contrast, Duffy offered no evidence indicating that the decision to deny a 
dumpster was motivated by his disability.  See CG v. Pa. Dep’t of Educ., 734 F.3d 229, 
236 (3d Cir. 2013) (stating that to satisfy the ADA’s causation requirement, “Plaintiffs 
must prove that they were treated differently based on the protected characteristic, 
namely the existence of their disability.”).  Under these circumstances, we conclude that 
                                              
3 In our discussion, we will assume, without deciding, that Duffy was a qualified 
individual with a disability under the ADA. 
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the District Court properly granted the motion to dismiss Commissioner Banta and Kent 
County’s motion for summary judgment on Duffy’s ADA claims.   
 The District Court also properly granted summary judgment in favor of the 
defendants on Duffy’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims.  The Fifth Amendment, 
made applicable to state and local governments through the Fourteenth Amendment, 
authorizes the taking of private property for public use if just compensation is paid to the 
owner.  See Cowell v. Palmer Twp., 263 F.3d 286, 290 (3d Cir. 2001).  A Takings Clause 
claim cannot lie where the plaintiff was not deprived of all beneficial uses of his property.  
See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979).  Assuming that Duffy’s Fifth 
Amendment claim was ripe, see Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton 
Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 186, 195 (1985), we conclude that the defendants’ actions did not 
constitute a taking.  There is no dispute that Duffy maintained ownership of the property 
and that the structures on that property were unsafe.  Notably, the destruction of the 
unsafe structures was performed pursuant to exercises of traditional police power, “which 
do not entitle the individuals affected to compensation.”  National Amusements Inc. v. 
Borough of Palmyra, 716 F.3d 57, 63 (3d Cir. 2013) (recognizing that the “government 
must pay just compensation for . . . takings ‘except to the extent that “background 
principles of nuisance and property law” independently restrict the owner’s intended use 
of the property.’” (quoting Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005))); 
McKenzie v. City of Chicago, 118 F.3d 552, 557 (7th Cir. 1997) (“Razing nuisances, like 
killing diseased livestock and burning infected plants, is a time-honored use of a state’s 
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police power”).  In addition, Duffy has not shown that the lien on his property 
“foreclose[d] all economically viable uses of the land.”  Cowell, 263 F.3d at 291 (holding 
that imposition of a municipal lien did not constitute a taking).   
 Duffy also failed to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact 
concerning his claim that the defendants violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment.  
A “seizure” of property occurs when “there is some meaningful interference with an 
individual’s possessory interests in that property.”  Soldal v. Cook County, Ill., 506 U.S. 
56, 61 (1992).  Whether a government seizure violates the Fourth Amendment depends 
on its overall reasonableness, which must be based upon a “careful balancing of 
governmental and private interests.”  Id. at 71 (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 
325, 341 (1985)).  Here, the Magistrate Judge properly concluded that the seizure was 
reasonable because the structures on Duffy’s property posed a danger to the public, 
because the defendants provided Duffy with proper notice of the condemnation and 
demolition, and because Duffy was able to challenge the defendants’ actions, including 
seeking an injunction in the Court of Chancery.  See Freeman v. City of Dallas, 242 F.3d 
642, 651 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (holding that warrantless demolition of a nuisance 
property was not unreasonable where “the City[] adhere[d] to its ordinances and 
procedures as a prelude to ordering the landowners to abate their nuisance structures.”); 
Samuels v. Meriwether, 94 F.3d 1163, 1168 (8th Cir. 1996) (concluding that no Fourth 
Amendment violation occurred where “the City acted pursuant to a noticed hearing and a 
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resolution effectuating municipal ordinances.”).  Therefore, the defendants were entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law.   
 Accordingly, as these appeals present no substantial question, we will grant the 
Appellees’ motions to summarily affirm the judgments of the District Court.4
                                              
4 We have considered Duffy’s letter in support of appeal (filed in C.A. No. 14-1668 on 
May 2, 2014), his “Motion of Objections,” which outlines the causes for his appeals 
(filed in C.A. Nos. 14-1668 and 14-1669 on May 21, 2014), and his document in support 
of appeal (filed in C.A. No. 14-1668 on Oct. 8, 2014).  All of Duffy’s outstanding 
motions in both appeals are denied.   
